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Abstract
We use experimental methods to study the power of leading by
words. The context is a voluntary contribution mechanism with one-
way communication. One group member can send a free-form text
message to his fellow players. Contrary to the commonly-accepted
wisdom that the cooperation-enhancing eﬀect of communication re-
quires the mutual exchange of promises, we ﬁnd that the introduction
of one-way communication increases contributions substantially and
decreases their variation. When communication is one-shot, its eﬀect
on contribution levels persists over time. Moreover, one-way commu-
nication is eﬀective even in the absence of strategic concerns.
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One of the most consistent experimental ﬁndings in the social dilemma lit-
erature is that costless, non-binding and non-veriﬁable communication (i.e.,
cheap talk) has a positive eﬀect on cooperation.1 But what is it about
communication that boosts cooperation? Three aspects of communication
have been suggested in the literature as inductive to cooperation (see, e.g.,
Dawes, McTavish and Shaklee 1977): identiﬁcation, discussion, and com-
mitment. Several experimental studies demonstrate that neither mere iden-
tiﬁcation nor discussion is sine qua non for the communication eﬀect to take
place (see, e.g., Bouas and Komorita 1996; Bohnet and Frey 1999; Brosig,
Weimann and Ockenfels 2003). Instead, the commitment to cooperate, in
the form of a mutual exchange of promises and pledges, is considered crucial
for the cooperation-enhancing eﬀect of communication (see Kopelman, We-
ber and Messick 2002 and Bicchieri and Lev-On 2007 for surveys of relevant
work in the psychology and economics literature, respectively).2
Most of the evidence on the role of commitment comes from two kinds of
studies. First, experiments that draw a comparison between face-to-face and
other forms of communication (e-mails, chat-rooms, audio-conferences, nu-
merical cheap talk; see, for instance, Frohlich and Oppenheimer 1971; 1998;
Brosig et al. 2003; Bochet, Page and Putterman 2006). Such experiments
ﬁnd that the strength of the communication eﬀect depends on the commu-
nication medium, with a stronger eﬀect of face-to-face discussion compared
to any other alternative. The crucial factor here is that face-to-face dis-
cussion facilitates the exchange of mutual promises.3 Notice, however, that
all these communication opportunities do allow subjects to exchange non-
binding promises, thereby encumbering the assessment of the eﬀectiveness
of commitment in enhancing cooperation. Second, experiments that draw a
comparison between face-to-face and passive communication4 (e.g., Brosig
et al. 2003). This approach prevents commitment at the cost of rendering
1Sally (1995) oﬀers a meta-analysis of 35 years of social dilemma experiments and shows
that enabling people to communicate increases cooperation rates signiﬁcantly. Balliet
(2010), in a more recent meta-analysis, reports similar results.
2A notable exception is Bochet and Putterman (2009).
3According to Bicchieri and Lev-On (2007, pg. 145), “using computer-mediated com-
munication instead of face-to-face communication can hamper the generation of normative
settings in which promises are perceived as reliable”.
4Passive communication means that subjects may attend but not intervene in the
communication of outsiders (that is, people that do not belong to their group).
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An unambiguous way of studying whether commitment is necessary for
cooperation, in the sense that the eﬀect of communication vanishes in its
absence, calls for a setting where mutual pledges to cooperate are ruled out
by design while the in-group communication channels remain intact. In this
paper we provide a series of experimental studies based on such a setting.
We consider a linear public goods game with one-way communication.
All group members make their contribution decisions privately and simulta-
neously. But prior to this, one of them, a group member that is randomly
assigned the role of “communicator”, can send a free-form text message to
his fellow players.5 This method of unidirectional messaging precludes the
mutual exchange of promises. Hence, if commitment were necessary for the
rise in cooperation rates, we would not observe any diﬀerence in contribution
levels in comparison to a no-communication baseline treatment. If, on the
other hand, all that is needed in order to overcome the problem of free riding
is a “primed” cooperative behavioral rule, and all group members’ prefer-
ences are consistent with that rule (see, e.g., Kerr, Garst, Lewandowski and
Harris 1997; Bicchieri 2006), then the presence of the communicator should
promote contribution towards the public good.
We run two series of experiments. The ﬁrst series consists of ﬁnitely
repeated games in which the primary treatment variable is the number of
communication opportunities. The baseline treatment involves no communi-
cation at all. In two other treatments, participants can communicate either
prior to each and every period (continuous communication) or just prior to
the ﬁrst period (pre-play communication). With these experiments we can
assess not only the eﬀectiveness of one-way communication but also its de-
pendence on the frequency of messaging. The second series of experiments
consists of one-shot games where people have no strategic incentives to con-
tribute (Kreps, Milgrom, Roberts and Wilson 1982). These experiments
allow us to investigate whether strategic reputation building is essential for
the workings of one-way communication.
Another way of looking at our setup is to consider the communicator as a
5We prefer free-form text messages to face-to-face communication so as to isolate the
impact of the message’s content from visual (i.e., body language, eye contact, facial ex-
pressions) and verbal cues (tone of voice, phrasing, ﬂuency, manner of expressing moral
rhetoric). We prefer free-form to pre-speciﬁed messages so as to allow subjects to express
freely their thoughts and views of the game.
3
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carry. For example, Susan B. Anthony strongly promoted women’s suﬀrage
in the United States by giving, over a 45-year period, 75 to 100 speeches per
year. Moreover, L¨ ofgren and Nordblom’s (2010) survey shows that people
in Sweden became less reluctant towards the CO2 tax on gasoline after the
release of Al Gore’s global warming documentary “An inconvenient truth”.
Previous experiments dealing with communication in social dilemma
games testify that the presence of a leader that dominates the discussion
elicits mutually beneﬁcial cooperation. Orbell, van de Kragt and Dawes
(1991), for instance, note that self-selected group leaders encourage a par-
ticular strategy and ask the others to conform to it; in leaderless groups,
instead, agents ﬁnd it diﬃcult to reach an agreement and often terminate
the discussion ahead of time. Rocco (1998) conducts a ﬁnitely repeated com-
mon pool resource experiment and compares a face-to-face treatment with an
electronic mailing list treatment. Unlike face-to-face communication where
the ﬁrst group member to advocate a position gains leadership status and
inﬂuences disproportionately his fellow members, electronic communication
inhibits the establishment of eﬀective cooperation agreements. Finally, Si-
mon and Gorgura (2006) observe that the emergence of a leader within a
group deters dissent and helps people keep talking.7 In these studies all
members can communicate with each other and leadership emerges endoge-
nously. Consequently, whether the message(s) of an exogenously appointed
leader inﬂuence the eﬀectiveness of communication in social dilemma games
remains, to the best of our knowledge, an open question.8
Whether and to what extent one-way communication, in the form of
6With a few exceptions (e.g., Houser, Levy, Padgitt, Peart and Xiao 2007; G¨ urerk,
Irlenbusch and Rockenbach 2009), experimental economists investigating the eﬀects of
leadership in social dilemma games concentrated on leading by example (see, e.g., Moxnes
and van der Heijden 2003; G¨ uth, Levati, Sutter and van der Heijden 2007; Levati, Sutter
and van der Heijden 2007; Potters, Sefton and Vesterlund 2007).
7For an account of the importance of leaders in coordinating the group see also Bicchieri
(2006). In a similar vein, but from a theoretical perspective, Foss (1999) observes that
somebody who leads via suggesting a strategy can coordinate the actions of many people
by making that strategy commonly known.
8The study of leadership by words has been pursued in more detail in the context of
coordination games (see, e.g., Brandts and Cooper 2007 and references therein). Pogrebna,
Krantz, Schade and Keser (2009) consider a voluntary contribution game where ﬁrst the
leader can promise to contribute a certain amount and then all group members make
binding contribution decisions. The authors compare leading by pre-game communication
with leading by example and ﬁnd that contributions do not depend on the leadership style.
4
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be of interest to group organizers and institution designers. As noted for
example by Messick and Brewer (1983), multilateral communication in real-
world social dilemmas can be very costly, or even unfeasible.9 Yet, if – as
our results indicate – one-way communication fosters cooperative outcomes
and one-shot communication is as eﬀective as communication on a repeated
basis, then the required organizational cost may be lower than presumed.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out our experimental
design and details our research questions. Sections 3 and 4 provide analyt-
ical results on the ﬁnitely repeated and one-shot treatments, respectively.
Section 5 concludes.
2 The experiment
2.1 The basic public goods game
The basic game is the voluntary contribution mechanism (e.g., Isaac, Walker
and Thomas 1984). Let I = {1,...,4} stand for a group of four participants
who interact for t = 1,...,T periods in a partner design (that is group
composition does not change throughout the experiment). At the beginning
of every period, each individual i ∈ I is endowed with 25 ECU (Experimental
Currency Units) which he can either consume privately or contribute to a
public good. Denoting i’s contribution level by ci,t, where 0 ≤ ci,t ≤ 25, his
monetary payoﬀ per period is given by:
πi,t(ct) = (25 − ci,t) + 0.4
4 X
j=1
cj,t ∀ i,t, (1)
where ct = (c1,t,...,c4,t) and 0.4
P4
j=1 cj,t represent the period t strategy
proﬁle and income from the project, respectively.
Since the marginal per capita return is less than unity, the dominant
strategy for a monetary payoﬀ maximizer is to contribute nothing. If all
group members free rided, then each one of them would earn 25 ECU. On
the other hand, the socially eﬃcient outcome (i.e., the outcome that is max-
9Most social dilemmas are large group problems (e.g., global environmental problems)
oﬀering participants little or no opportunity at all to either communicate or negotiate a
solution.
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all group members made the socially eﬃcient choice, then each one of them
would earn 40 ECU. The dominance of free riding extends to the ﬁnitely
repeated game: it can be shown, by means of backward induction, that free
riding in each period is the unique subgame perfect equilibrium.
2.2 Treatments and research questions
Using a between-subjects design, we study ﬁve treatments that build on
the basic game described above. The treatments diﬀer with respect to the
number of repetitions and, in the case of repeated games, the frequency of
communication.
2.2.1 Finitely repeated games
In the ﬁrst three treatments, participants interact for ten periods. The
characteristics of these treatments are as follows:
Baseline (B10): Group members cannot communicate with each other. In
each period, they decide simultaneously and privately on the number
of ECU that they want to contribute to the public good.
Continuous Communication (CC): At the beginning of the experiment,
one member of each group is randomly appointed communicator (a
role which he retains throughout the experiment). The communicator
is given, prior to each period, the opportunity to send a message to
his co-players.
Pre-play Communication (PC): The (randomly selected) communicator
can send just one message prior to the ﬁrst period (i.e., in advance of
any decision making). Afterward, group interaction follows B10.
These treatments are expressly designed to address the following ques-
tions:
Question 1: Does one-way communication aﬀect contributions towards
the public good?
Question 2: Is the number of communication periods relevant, i.e., does
the eﬀect of one-way communication depend on whether written messages
are sent repeatedly or just once?
6
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and how they do inﬂuence behavior?
The correspondence between these research questions and the methods
used to address them is displayed in the upper panel of Table 1.
[Table 1 about here.]
With regard to Question 1, a number of papers have addressed the theo-
retical conditions under which augmenting the game with cheap talk helps to
achieve eﬃcient outcomes (see Farrell and Rabin 1996 and Crawford 1998
for surveys). Yet, whenever individual and group interests conﬂict com-
pletely (as in our case), cheap talk is not expected to alter the prediction of
full free riding insofar as people care only about their own monetary payoﬀ.
However, this prediction has been contradicted by decades of experimental
research, with commitment being regarded as the most likely explanation of
the eﬀect of communication.
We argue that there is more to the communication’s impact on cooper-
ation than the behavioral importance of promises to cooperate.10 The com-
municator may enhance cooperation by underlining other facets of the game
(like the eﬃciency gains that can be obtained under full contribution by all
subjects) or by “priming” a cooperative rule with which all group members’
preferences are consistent. For instance, in his theoretical analysis of lead-
ership, Foss (1999, p. 22) maintains that a leader’s words can change the
payoﬀ structure of a prisoner’s dilemma by inﬂuencing preferences towards
generalized “niceness”. The game in this case becomes a coordination game
where the communicator’s cheap talk may be far more eﬀective (see, e.g.,
Farrell and Rabin 1996).11 On the basis of these arguments, we conjecture
a positive answer to Question 1.
Question 2 is more diﬃcult to tackle, as not only the existing research
contrasting pre-play with continuous communication is founded on multi-
directional communication, but its ﬁndings are also mixed. While certain
studies ﬁnd that pre-play communication has a lasting eﬀect on cooperation
(Radlow and Weidner 1996; Brosig et al. 2003; Balliet 2010), others ﬁnd that
10Gneezy (2005), Charness and Dufwenberg (2006), and Vanberg (2008), among others,
have shown that people have a preference for keeping their word.
11See also Bicchieri (2006) for an analysis of how the establishment of a cooperative
social norm can transform a prisoner’s dilemma into a coordination game.
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municate (Ostrom, Walker and Gardner 1992; Frohlich and Oppenheimer
1998). In our PC treatment, the communicator may, on the one hand, ac-
tivate an internalized norm of cooperation that persists even in the absence
of further messages. On the other hand, individuals may need “counter re-
inforcers,” such as the communicator’s approval or disapproval, in order to
sustain a cooperative behavior. Thus, the answer to Question 2 is not a
priori clear.
Finally, we have no preconceptions about Question 3. Previous stud-
ies analyzing the content of communication either involve multi-directional
communication or consider games where promises to cooperate play a cru-
cial role (see, e.g., Charness and Dufwenberg 2006; Simon and Gorgura 2006;
Brandts and Cooper 2007; Sutter and Strassmair 2009).
2.2.2 One-shot games
Here, participants interact just once.
Baseline (B1): The group members cannot communicate with each other.
They make a one-shot contribution decision.
Communication (C): Before the one-shot interaction, one member of each
group is randomly appointed communicator and can send a message
to his co-players.
These two treatments intend to address the following question (see as
well the lower panel of Table 1):
Question 4: What is the eﬀect of one-way communication when subjects
are denied the opportunity to play strategically?
In ﬁnitely repeated games, if the information about types is incomplete,
strategic reasoning may by itself suﬃce to bring about more cooperation.
For example, suppose that a selﬁsh player believes that some other players in
his group are conditional cooperators (that is they cooperate conditionally
on the others’ contributions) and that the communicator’s message might
coordinate them on a speciﬁc contribution. Then, it may be optimal for
him to contribute that amount early in the game (so as to induce these
conditional cooperators to contribute) but free ride later on (Kreps et al.
8
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with one-shot interaction there are no incentives for such a forward-looking
behavior. Hence, by comparing individual contributions in B1 and C, we
can assess whether one-way communication is eﬀective in the absence of
strategic incentives.
2.3 Procedures
The experiment was programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007) and con-
ducted in the experimental laboratory of the Max Planck Institute of Eco-
nomics (Jena, Germany). The subjects were undergraduate students from
the Friedrich-Schiller University of Jena. They were recruited using the
ORSEE (Greiner 2004) software. Upon entering the laboratory, the sub-
jects were randomly assigned to visually isolated computer terminals. The
instructions (which are reproduced in the supplement) were distributed and
then read aloud to establish common knowledge. All subjects’ questions
were answered individually at their seats. Before starting the experiment,
subjects had to answer a control questionnaire which tested their compre-
hension of the rules.
One-shot treatments started with six training periods that involved nei-
ther interaction (the others’ decisions were selected randomly by the com-
puter) nor communication. The sole aim of these periods was to familiarize
the participants with the game and its incentives (no payments were asso-
ciated with them).
Whenever communication was allowed, the communicator could use a
text box to type in his message. He had a maximum of four minutes to
compose the message, but it was at his discretion to send it ahead of the
deadline. In principle, the form of the message was free, the only restric-
tions to its content being that the communicator could neither identify him-
self, nor threaten the other group members, nor promise side-payments. To
enforce compliance with these restrictions, all messages were screened be-
fore being sent.12 Then, all of them were delivered simultaneously. It was
common knowledge that (a) the messages were cheap talk (i.e., costless and
non-binding), (b) all group members received exactly the same message from
the group communicator, and (c) only after having read the communicator’s
12Improper messages were to be screened out and their sender was supposed to be given
a warning for misconduct, but as a matter of fact such a thing never happened.
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contributions.
Participants in the one-shot treatments got at the end of the experiment
feedback on (a) the number of ECU contributed by each group member
(with the individual contributions being sorted in descending order), (b) the
income from the project, and (c) their corresponding payoﬀ. Participants
in the repeated treatments received the same information at the end of each
period.
Payoﬀs were quoted in ECU: 10 ECU = 400 (50) euro cents in the one-
shot (repeated) treatments. Participants in the one-shot treatments earned
on average e15.12, inclusive of a e2.50 show-up fee. Participants in the
repeated treatments were paid in private their accumulated earnings at the
end of the last period. Average earnings per subject were e20.60.
3 Results on the ﬁnitely repeated treatments
We ran three sessions per treatment (B10, CC, and PC). Each session
involved 24 participants. With group size equal to 4, we have 18 independent
observations per treatment. The results are presented in two parts: ﬁrst,
the eﬀects of one-way communication on contribution levels; and second,
the communication’s content and its relation to contribution choices.
3.1 The eﬀects of one-way communication
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of average group contributions.13 The
mean and median of the series in the CC and PC treatments are notably
larger than their respective values in the B10 treatment. In addition, the
standard deviation is smaller, which should not be surprising given that for
CC and PC the median average group contribution is equal to the maximum
contribution, namely 25.14 The disparity in dispersion between the baseline
and the communication-allowing treatments becomes more pronounced once
13The CC and PC independent observation series contain outlying observations at the
lower tail of their distributions. Thus, in what follows, besides the conventional descriptive
statistics (mean and standard deviation) we also report measures of location and scale
which are robust to the presence of outliers.
14In fact, 73.33% (72.78%) of the average group contributions in the CC (PC) treatment
equal the subjects’ endowment. The corresponding percentage in the B10 treatment is
20.56%.
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about the median (MAD) and Rousseeuw and Croux’s Q statistic.15
[Table 2 about here.]
Figure 1 shows how the time series of measures of location of the aver-
age group contributions respond to changes in our treatment variable. In
panel A, the baseline treatment replicates standard ﬁndings (e.g., Ledyard
1995): the mean of the average group contributions begins at 57.1% of the
endowment and declines with repetition (in the last period it stands at 18.8%
of the endowment). In contrast, in the communication-allowing treatments
the mean starts at very high levels (89.6% and 90.0% of the endowment
in CC and PC, respectively) and remains fairly stable in all periods but
the last (its period 9 value is 85.4% of the endowment in CC and 83.3%
of the endowment in PC). This stability is clearer if we acknowledge that
in the communication-allowing treatments the distributions of the average
group contributions in each period are skewed to the left (i.e., they have
relatively few low values, see Figure 2), and opt for their median values as
better indicators of their central tendency. In periods 1 to 9, the medians
of the average group contributions in the CC and PC treatments equal 25
(see Figure 1B). Furthermore, it is in period 9 that the diﬀerence between
the median series of the baseline and communication-allowing treatments
reaches its maximum value (that is 19.1 ECUs, or, alternatively, 76.5% of
the endowment).
[Figure 1 about here.]
One-sided Wilcoxon rank sum tests with group contributions averaged
over all 10 periods as independent observation units conﬁrm that the com-
municator’s presence raises contribution levels signiﬁcantly (p < 0.01 in
both CC vs B10 and PC vs B10 comparisons). The same holds if we com-
pare average group contributions in any particular period; all p-values are
well below the conventional signiﬁcance levels (the largest of them, equal to
0.003, is associated with the sixth period comparison between B10 and PC).
15If {x1,...,xn} is a set of numbers, MAD = b medi|xi − medjxj| (where med stands
for median and b is a correction factor for consistency) is the most frequently used robust
estimate of scale. However, MAD is aimed at symmetric distributions. The Q estimator,
deﬁned as the 0.25 quantile of the distances {|xi − xj|;i < j}, besides being suitable for
asymmetric distributions, is more eﬃcient than the MAD.
11
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appear to have any signiﬁcant eﬀect: it is not possible to reject the null
hypothesis that the CC and PC groups of independent observations have
identical distributions (p = 0.32; two-sided Wilcoxon rank sum test). The
same result holds for individual periods (the smallest p-value is 0.30 in the
third period).
Figure 2 draws for each individual treatment boxplots of the average
group contributions observed in each period, and illustrates the participants’
tendency in the communication-allowing treatments to contribute their en-
tire endowment.16 More speciﬁcally, in the CC treatment, 10 out of 18
groups are socially optimizing in periods 1 to 9 (one of them in periods 1 to
10). An equal number of groups are socially optimizing in PC in periods 1
to 9 (ﬁve of them in periods 1 to 10). In B10, in contrast, two thirds of the
groups never choose the socially eﬃcient amount.
[Figure 2 about here.]
The aforementioned behavioral stability is corroborated by the results
of Wilcoxon signed rank tests comparing the distributions of average group
contributions in the ﬁrst and ninth periods of each treatment. These tests
detect no location shift diﬀerent from zero in the case of CC and PC, but
a signiﬁcant period eﬀect in the case of B10 (p = 0.53 for CC; p = 0.36 for
PC; p = 0.005 for B10; the reported signiﬁcance levels correspond to the
two-sided version of the test).
Finally, the end-period eﬀect (deﬁned here as the proportional change
in either the mean or the median of the average group contribution series
between periods 9 and 10) is weaker in the communication-allowing treat-
ments. The communicator is able to either “prime” a cooperative rule that
stays in place even in the ﬁnal period or inﬂuence preferences towards perfect
conditonal cooperation.17
To conclude, the results of this section can be summarized as follows:
Result 1: One-way communication signiﬁcantly increases contributions
to the public good and renders them relatively stable in all periods but the
last.
16The boxplots corresponding to periods 2 to 9 (2 to 8) in CC (PC) collapse to a single
value as all ﬁve statistics that they typically depict (lower non-outlier value, ﬁrst quartile,
median, third quartile, and higher non-outlier value) equal 25.
17Section 5 elaborates on these two alternative explanations.
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ﬁrst period only or prior to all periods bears no inﬂuence on contribution
behavior.
3.2 The communication content
Our categorization scheme of the communicators’ arguments is described in
Table 3 (the methodological details are given in Appendix A). The rela-
tive frequencies of observing the argument(s) implied by each category are
reported in Table 4. To facilitate between-treatment comparisons, relative
frequencies for CC are calculated separately for the ﬁrst and then all sub-
sequent periods.
[Table 3 about here.]
[Table 4 about here.]
All ﬁrst-period messages can be classiﬁed into at least one of our cate-
gories, which we interpret as a sign that the communicators took their task
seriously. This attitude translates in the present case into high ﬁrst-period
contributions, which in turn have a lasting positive eﬀect on the groups’
performance.18
A comparison between the third and fourth columns of Table 4 reveals
that the choice of ﬁrst-period arguments is only marginally aﬀected by the
communication conditions. The vast majority of communicators propose a
speciﬁc contribution (category 1) and stress the importance of conformity
within the group (category 2). Indeed, these two arguments are always
concurrent: the communicator seems to understand that if there are condi-
tionally cooperators in the group, contributing the suggested amount favors
cooperation.
In both treatments, ﬁrst-period suggestions are often accompanied by
calculations of the associated payoﬀs (category 4). Communicators also try
to motivate the others by drawing their attention to the payoﬀs that can
be achieved under full cooperation (category 5). Arguments that rational-
ize suggestions on the grounds of either satisfaction (category 6) or fairness
18The signiﬁcance of ﬁrst-period play in social dilemma games is well documented (e.g.,
Keser and van Winden 2000).
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ples’ attention to the possible repercussions of their actions (category 10),
in particular the likely eﬀects of free riding on overall behavior. Notice that
unilateral promises (category 9) occur just twice in CC.
In CC, the communicator in all ten groups that start with and retain (at
least till period 9) an average group contribution of 25 invokes in the ﬁrst
period the eﬃciency and conformity arguments.19 These arguments do not
appear in tandem in the ﬁrst-period messages sent within groups numbered
2, 3, and 8, but each one of these groups achieves full contribution once its
communicator has jointly invoked them. Hence, in CC, the conjunction of
eﬃciency and conformity arguments seems to drive group contribution to
the maximum.
In PC, the arguments of categories 2, 3 and 4 are mentioned in all
groups where average group contribution remains ﬁxed at 25 for (at least)
the ﬁrst nine periods.20 In groups that do not consistently cooperate fully
(that is groups 8, 9, 15 and 17), the communicators do not make an eﬃcient
suggestion and/or do not calculate the associated payoﬀ.21 Thus, in PC,
the eﬃciency argument needs to be supplemented not only by conformity
suggestions but also by payoﬀ calculations in order that one-way communi-
cation has a strong impact on contribution levels.
The analysis of messages in the remaining periods of CC aims to answer
two questions. The ﬁrst is what communicators do in the face of initially
high contribution levels. This topic is fraught with diﬃculties as (a) 27%
of the messages sent in periods 2 to 10 are either empty or do not include
arguments relevant to our categorization, and (b) in comparison to ﬁrst-
period messages, communicators attach less weight to all subsequent ones.
Our data indicate that once the eﬃcient outcome has been achieved, the
communicator sooner or later understands that group contribution will re-
19These are the groups numbered 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 12, 14, 16, 17 and 18. The same holds
for group 11 where average group contribution equals 25 for periods 1 to 8, and group 13
where deviations from maximum average contribution are (with the exception of period 6)
no larger than 0.25 ECU.
20These are groups 1, 2, 4, 6, 7, 10, 11, 12, 14 and 16. The same happens with groups 5
and 13, where one group member deviates from maximum contribution in the ﬁrst period
(c24,1 = 24 in group 5 and c53,1 = 20 in group 13).
21Here we provide a general description rather than exact rules. For example, even if
the criteria of categories 2 to 4 are satisﬁed, the members of group 18 contribute fully just
in periods 2 to 6. And the absence of payoﬀ calculation does not prevent the members of
group 3 to contribute fully in periods 1 to 8.
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most of the messages, if any, suggest to keep on with the same behavior
(category 1), and/or praise past behavior (category 12).
The second issue of interest is how communicators react to low contrib-
utors. In the three groups where ﬁrst-period contributions are less than
suggested, this is communicated to the other group members in the second
period (category 11). In group 10, the communicator uses a trigger strategy
(category 9) and his threats prevent free riding in all but the ﬁnal period.
In group 1, the communicator’s appeal to fairness (category 12) fails to sta-
bilize contributions. Finally, the communicator of group 15 undercuts (in
the ﬁrst period) his own suggestion. The group achieves full contribution in
the following three periods, but average contribution declines dramatically
following a second attempt by the communicator to free ride.
4 One-way communication without strategic play
We ran one session per treatment (B1 and C). Each session involved 32
participants. Since there is no path dependence, we consider the individuals’
contributions independent observations.22
Figure 3A draws histograms of the two data sets of contributions. While
the distribution of the B1 data is skewed to the right, that of the C data is
bimodal (with more than 50% of the data points falling into the two extreme
classes).
[Figure 3 about here.]
Figure 3B graphs empirical estimates of the cumulative distribution func-
tions for the distributions that generated the two treatments’ contribution
data.23 The B1 treatment probability function rises steeply for ci ≤ 15 (over
90% of the observations are less than or equal to 15) and levels oﬀ for the
remaining values. In the C treatment, in contrast, less than 50% of the
observations are lying within the [0,15] range. Following the introduction
of one-way communication, the mean (median) contribution rises from 6.9
22The analysis of the eﬀects of one-way communication can be replicated using average
group contributions, with the results remaining qualitatively the same.
23The empirical cumulative distribution function F(ci) gives the proportion of observa-
tions in a sample which are less than or equal to ci.
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bility distributions are stochastically diﬀerent (the p-value of the two sample
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is less than 0.01), implying that strategic play can
not be the driving engine of the eﬀectiveness of one-way communication.
Thus, the answer to the fourth question of Table 1 can be formulated as
follows:
Result 3: One-way communication stimulates contributions even when
subjects are denied the possibility to play strategically.
Finally, Table 5 reports the occurrence frequencies of the arguments
that apply to one-shot communication.24 Among all groups with an average
group contribution at least equal to 65% of the endowment (the groups
numbered 1, 2, 3, 4, 7 and 8), all but two communicators (in groups 3 and
7) mention the arguments pertaining to categories 2, 3, and 4. The absence
of the eﬃciency suggestion in the messages sent within groups 5 and 6 is
associated with lower average group contributions. These results parallel
our ﬁndings for the PC treatment, and conﬁrm the importance of advancing
the eﬃciency and conformity arguments, as well as of exemplifying payoﬀ
computations, to contribution levels.
[Table 5 about here.]
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we have studied the eﬀects of one-way communication in a
voluntary contribution experiment. While it is commonly accepted that
the cooperation-enhancing eﬀect of communication hinges on the mutual
exchange of promises, we ﬁnd that enabling one group member to send a
free-form text message to his co-players increases contributions signiﬁcantly.
This ﬁnding does not depend on the frequency of communication. Thus,
contrary to what Jerdee and Rosen (1974) and Frohlich and Oppenheimer
(1998) maintain, communication is eﬀective even in the absence of verbal
reinforces. Furthermore, it does not depend on strategic play, meaning that
communication is eﬀective even if there is no prospect of future interactions.
24All messages can be classiﬁed into at least one category, attesting once again the
communicators’ commitment to reasoned arguments.
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to the speech of out-groups are considered inappropriate for enhancing co-
operation (Brosig et al. 2003). However, the origin of the message in our
experiment is internal to the group, so that both the communicator and
the recipients of the message engage in common endeavors and share the
same “fate”. Social identity theory may explain why an in-group (rather
than an out-group) communicator is eﬀective (see, e.g., De Cremer and van
Knippenberg 2002). Yet, the practical implications of our results are worth
pointing out: a low-cost communication medium, like the internet, may be
a suitable platform for addressing issues raised in social dilemma problems.
Even with projects where many individuals interact via long distance, what
seems to do the trick is the presence of a collaborator who sends a timely
message to the others exhorting them to cooperate.
We advance two possible, albeit not mutually exclusive, explanations of
our ﬁndings. The ﬁrst explanation, which is in line with the arguments of,
e.g., Kerr et al. (1997) and Balliet (2010), suggests that the communica-
tor’s messages activate an internalized norm of cooperation that enduringly
increases the individuals’ propensity to contribute, thereby aﬀecting their
behavior even when no further interactions are expected. Our analysis of the
content of the communicator’s messages reveals that eﬃciency and confor-
mity may constitute such norms. The second potential explanation relates
to the premise that in the presence of a communicator, who either inﬂu-
ences preferences towards perfect conditional cooperation (in the sense that
everyone wants to match the average contribution) or aﬀects the conditional
cooperators’ expectations about the others’ behavior, the original game is
perceived as a coordination game with multiple Pareto-ranked equilibria
(e.g., Foss 1999; Bicchieri 2006). In this case, the communicator merely
serves as an eﬃcient coordination device.
While the above explanations may be useful in interpreting our results,
further research is needed in order to fully understand why one-way com-
munication is so eﬀective in establishing mutually beneﬁcial cooperative
relationships.
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Our categorization methodology follows Cooper and Kagel (2005) and Sutter
and Strassmair (2009). Initially, two researchers examined independently a
sample of the messages and established their own distinct sets of preliminary
categories.25 Each category represents one or more arguments that the
communicator is likely to invoke, and each message may belong to more
than one category. After consultations, the two researchers agreed upon the
ﬁnal set of categories shown in Table 3.
Then three undergraduate research assistants coded (once again sepa-
rately) the total of the messages one by one: if one message contained the
argument(s) speciﬁed by some category, then that category was assigned the
value of 1 (otherwise, it was assigned the value of 0). The average corre-
lation coeﬃcient between the assistants’ codings ranged from 0.70 to 0.80
(0.81 to 0.89) for the ﬁrst-period messages sent in CC (PC), and from 0.75
to 0.79 for the messages sent in periods 2–10 in CC.26 We can not compute
such correlations coeﬃcients in the case of C, as the assistants often coded
with the same value all the available messages. As an alternative we report
that the number of times all coders agreed on 1 relative to the number of
times that at least one of them decided on 1 equals 0.85.27
Finally, the coders gathered, discussed their individual assessments and
arrived at a common coding (the results are reported in Tables 4 and 5 for
the repeated and one-shot treatments, respectively).
25Since the experiment was conducted in German, the categorization was undertaken
by Johannes Weisser and Matthias Uhl, a German native speaker familiar with all details
of the experiment.
26The correlation coeﬃcient values reported by Cooper and Kagel (2005) and Sutter
and Strassmair (2009) are somewhat smaller, implying that our categorization procedure
was more clear-cut.
27The corresponding ratios for the PC, CC (period 1) and CC (periods 2–10) treatments
are 0.79, 0.83 and 0.61, respectively.
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Jena Economic Research Papers 2009 - 106Table 1: Research questions and appropriate methodology
Research question Answering approach
1) Is one-way communication eﬀective?
Compare CC with B10
Compare PC with B10
2) Does communication frequency matter? Compare CC with PC
3) What kind of arguments are used? Study the messages’ content
4) Does strategic play matter? Compare C with B1
Note: Questions 1 to 3 are addressed in the context of ﬁnitely repeated games, question 4
in the context of one-shot games.
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Jena Economic Research Papers 2009 - 106Table 2: Summary statistics of average group contributions
across our ﬁnitely repeated treatments
Treatment Mean Std. dev. Median MAD Q
B10 12.27 8.73 11.62 11.68 8.16
CC 22.15 5.94 25.00 0.00 0.00
PC 21.75 6.68 25.00 0.00 0.00
Note: 180 observations per treatment.
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Jena Economic Research Papers 2009 - 106Table 3: Description of the communication content categories
Category Argument Description
1 Suggestion Suggestion (point or interval) of how much to contribute to the project (period 1), or
appeal to keep on with the same behavior (periods 2-10). The suggestion, whether
implicitly or explicit, must be unambiguous.
2 Conformity Emphasis on the need that all group members conform to the suggestion.
3 Eﬃcient suggestion Implicit or explicit suggestion to contribute the whole endowment.
4 Payoﬀ calculation Calculation of the (period or overall) payoﬀ associated with the proposal.
5 Group payoﬀ maximization Explicit argument that the suggested amount maximizes the group payoﬀ, or con-
jecture that participants are interested in maximizing the group payoﬀ.
6 Satisfaction Explicit argument that people should be content with following (or with having
followed) the communicator’s suggestion.
7 Fairness Explicit reference to fairness or just behavior.
8 Team spirit Statement promoting the willingness to cooperate as part of a team.
9 Promise Pledge to contribute some speciﬁc amount.
10 Trigger Anticipation of potential behavioral dynamics.
11 Notiﬁcation of low contributors Implicit or explicit notiﬁcation of those who contributed less than suggested and/or
request to increase their contribution.
12 Praise Praise of observed actions.
2
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Jena Economic Research Papers 2009 - 106Table 4: Relative frequency of the arguments’ presence in PC and CC
Category Argument
PC CC
t = 1 t = 1 t > 1
1 Suggestion 0.94 0.94 0.57
2 Conformity 0.94 0.94 0.13
3 Eﬃcient suggestion 0.83 0.78 0.51
4 Payoﬀ calculation 0.78 0.67 0.04
5 Group payoﬀ maximization 0.50 0.78 0.01
6 Satisfaction 0.28 0.11 0.03
7 Fairness 0.22 0.17 0.02
8 Team spirit 0.44 0.28 0.09
9 Promise 0.00 0.11 0.03
10 Trigger 0.06 0.17 0.01
11 Notiﬁcation of low contributors - - 0.09
12 Praise - - 0.31
27




3 Eﬃcient suggestion 0.75
4 Payoﬀ calculation 1.00
5 Group payoﬀ maximization 0.50
6 Satisfaction 0.00
7 Fairness 0.12
8 Team spirit 0.62
9 Promise 0.38
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Figure 1: Mean and median of average group contributions over time
(ﬁnitely repeated treatments; 18 observations per period).
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Figure 2: Average group contribution in all periods (ﬁnitely repeated treat-
ments).
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Figure 3: Histograms and empirical cumulative distribution functions of in-
dividual contributions in the one-shot treatments.
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